

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Record

DATE: 16 February 1950

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1A

SUBJECT: Management Procedure In Jigsaw Subcommittee

Very shortly, Lt. Colonel Williams of USAF will submit a memorandum to the secretary of the Jigsaw Committee calling attention to the well-known and frequently discussed pace at which the original intent of Jigsaw is being carried out.

After identification with the subcommittee since early last fall, I feel it important to bring up one crucial aspect of that slow pace, which to my mind may require radical treatment. I'm quite conversant with the reasons given for it both in the subcommittee and, more publicly, in Jigsaw itself.

Very frankly, I feel that some of those reasons are rationalizations; some, camouflage (for which plausible defense can be made); and some, concrete explanations which need to be generalized.

It is quite clear to the more permanent members of the CIA, who have been sitting on the subcommittee, that until very recently the State Department's representatives contributed practically nothing to the committee and actually blocked its work by not only criticising the whole general undertakings of the CIA members of the committee, but also by continually insisting on going back to assumptions underlying the committee's appointment, general policies by Jigsaw itself, and other extraneous matters. I referred to this

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sort of thing in an earlier memo or two, such as those of October 24th and October 27th.

After yesterday's session, however, which was the second one under the chairmanship of Mr. Namzer, I think it is time to do some further self-evaluation and generalizing on the real reasons for the slow pace of the subcommittee and, therefore, the Jigsaw itself. The Air Force Intelligence representative confronted Mr. Namzer as chairman with the same dilemma which earlier the State Department representative, Mr. Namzer, had confronted

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when he was chairman of the subcommittee: he fired a steady stream of questions at the chairman which took up practically the entire time of the committee's two-hour session with matters either assumed in the committee's work or altogether outside its official competence and mission. The same thing had occurred when the State Department brought in Mr. Sachs earlier, and, of course, as indicated in my earlier memos, it occurred in the case of Mr. Bernie Morris a number of times.

As remarked above, it seems to me the constant repetition of this sort of difficulty, delay, and waste of time needs more significant diagnosis than has been given it. I raise the question whether it is not fundamentally a matter of management. In every case, so far as I recall, the chairman would have been justified in politely but firmly ruling out the questioning and the discussions as strictly out of order. This is a matter of perfectly legitimate

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management control. The remedy seems obvious. The sensibilities of all parties concerned can be taken care of. I realize it was this 25X1A precaution which made [REDACTED] permit the expenditure of time on reasoning with State Department members earlier; and it is this consideration which is moving Mr. Nünzer. But if my diagnosis is correct, it is time to tighten up severely and call for an introduction of control and management principles, and the severe use of some equivalent of Roberts Rules of Order.

I trust this memorandum will be given consideration in connection with the new expression of urgency by Col. Williams, even though he himself outrageously violated this principle in choosing 25X1A the time and place for presenting his complaint.

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